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Abstract
How does identity blind hiring, as opposed to sighted hiring, influence matching between
high ability candidates and high value jobs? Job seekers might face constraints in signaling
their abilities for lack of wealth and being denied education. Adding to this problem are
the prejudices and biases of employers as some believe White (advantaged) applicants, on
average with more wealth, contain a greater proportion of high abilities compared to Black
(disadvantaged) applicants. Given such distorted beliefs, jobs/skills matching may improve
or worsen under blind hiring, and there may co-exist unfilled vacancies and unemployment.
The positive outcome, from job seekers’ point of view, is when employers collectively view the
blind pool of the uneducated applicants to have enough high ability candidates worth risking
filling up their high value slots rather than leaving the positions vacant. The negative outcome
occurs when the blind pool is perceived to contain a low percentage of high ability candidates,
so the advantaged high ability candidates with no wealth remain unemployed while they would
have been assigned to high value jobs under sighted hiring.
Finally, if education is more than a mere signal and enhances productivity in the low value
jobs, unemployment will be less. But there is also a possibility that the low ability workers
of the employers-favored advantaged group choose not to educate themselves even when they
have the necessary wealth. Identity neutral hiring may or may not eliminate such perverse
incentives.
JEL Classification Number: J78, I24. Key Words: Prejudice, bias, ability, social iden-
tity, wealth inequality, education, job market signaling, identity neutral policy, job assignment.
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“Should you change your name to get a job? The extreme measures some people take to fight
hiring bias might surprise you. But some say it’s the only way.”
– Careers Job Search Psychology, BBC, September 15, 2016
(http://www.bbc.com/capital/story/20160915-should-you-change-your-name-to-get-a-job)
1 Introduction
Starting with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting any form of discrimination in employment,
legal positions of various states in USA regarding affirmative action, to expand job opportunities
and university admissions for minorities, have fluctuated a great deal;1 see the history of affirma-
tive action policies from the 1960s (https://www.aaaed.org/aaaed/history of affirmative action.asp).2
For discrimination in jobs, not only is one’s ethnicity a concern, but gender is also an issue.
Discrimination against females in employment and enterprise continues to persist even now, as
highlighted on May 25, 2016 by the American Economic Association.3 Latest, in the Harvard
admissions lawsuit for alleged discrimination against Asian-American applicants, a federal judge
in Massachusetts ruled in favor of Harvard saying, to achieve diversity, the university authorities
can use race, among other characteristics, to rank applicants.4
In the UK and continental Europe, affirmative action has never been favored. The UK Equality
Act 2010 prohibits any form of direct or indirect discrimination, including ‘positive discrimina-
tion’. Thus, UK and EU policies are color-blind, what we call identity neutral, for the Act’s
explicit requirement that employers demonstrate neutrality. In contrast, India and Malaysia have
constitutional provisions for preferential treatment in education and government jobs for histori-
cally disadvantaged communities.5
In this paper, we focus on an important aspect of affirmative action, the effectiveness of
identity neutral hiring vis-a-vis identity dependent (or sighted) hiring. Specifically, under the
two alternative modes of hiring, how employers treat workers of unknown ability, while trying to
assign them to jobs that strictly requires high ability, is our central concern. If some employers
1Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/539/306/) had ruled
in favor of affirmative action in university admissions of underrepresented minority groups, while nine states
banned race-based affirmative action at all public universities (California (1996), Texas (1996), Washington (1998),
Florida (1999), Michigan (2006), Nebraska (2008), Arizona (2010), New Hampshire (2012), and Oklahoma (2012))
through voter referenda; see “What Can We Learn from States That Ban Affirmative Action?” available at
https://tcf.org/content/commentary/what-can-we-learn-from-states-that-ban-affirmative-action/.
2Sowell (2008) offers an international perspective.
3See https://www.aeaweb.org/research/can-strong-peer-networks-gender-gap-entrepreneurship, and in partic-
ular, the report “Gender Equality In Silicon Valley Will Take A Generation, Say Women Founders
And Funders” (https://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2016/05/13/gender-equality-in-silicon-valley-will-take-
a-generation-say-women-founders-and-funders/#7cfbbb52535b).
4See Oct 1, 2019 New York Times article, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/01/us/harvard-admissions-
lawsuit.html.
5See Deshpande (2006) and Abdullah (1997). Brazil, Canada, China, Japan and Nepal also have similar policies.
Japan has policies to help the Burakumin; in China, tribals and certain ethnic communities have to meet lesser
requirements than the majority of the Chinese population in education and public sector jobs. For USA, the Federal
government and contractors are obligated to hire minorities, though they do not have explicit job reservations.
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are prejudiced, the sense of which we make precise shortly, can the effect of their prejudice be
mitigated through identity neutral/blind policy, and in addition can positive discrimination also
be a ground for imposing blind hiring? What are the costs of ensuring equal treatment via identity
neutral hiring? These are some of the questions we analyze in a model of job matching within
the ability signaling framework of Spence (1975) and Hendel et al. (2005).
We consider a static model of job assignment with the number of jobs exactly equal to the
number of workers. Each firm has two jobs to allocate; one job is high value, requiring a high
ability worker; any mismatch will result in a significant loss to the firm. The other job is low
value that requires no specific ability. The high value job is also costly to leave unfilled. A section
of the job candidates, who are not wealth/credit constrained, are able to signal their high ability
by acquiring costly education; such workers receive priority in being assigned to high value jobs.
However, the number of candidates who signal their high ability are fewer than the number of high
value jobs. So the employers have to decide whether they will leave their high value jobs vacant,
or fill them from the pool of remaining workers, for whom they do not observe any ‘education’
signal and hence, cannot tell whether an uneducated worker is of high ability but lacked wealth
or is of low ability. They assess the workers’ likelihood of being high ability using their observable
traits, such as their social (i.e., ethnic, racial or religious) identity, which we classify into two
groups – advantaged and disadvantaged. The first group is more wealthy, but the two groups are
identical in terms of the distribution of ability.
Employers know the proportion of the wealthy people, but may hold different beliefs about the
ability distribution, in each group. This is where the notions of prejudice and bias come in. Some
employers believe that a member of the disadvantaged group is less likely to be of high ability
than she truly is; this is prejudice by our definition. Likewise, the same or other employers may
believe that a member of the advantaged group is more likely to be of high ability than she truly
is; this is what we call bias. Bias leads to favoritism toward the advantaged group and prejudice
leads to discrimination against the disadvantaged group. There are also employers whose beliefs
are neutral to one or both groups, i.e., same as the true probabilities. Prejudice and bias matter
only when it comes to a decision of assigning an uneducated worker to an unfilled high value job.
In the assignment of a known ‘high ability’ worker to a high value job, or an unknown ability
worker to a low value job, employers’ beliefs are immaterial. Hence, ours is a ‘mild’ form of
prejudice and bias.
We depart from the existing literature on discrimination in two ways. First, while we look
at the important issue of identity neutral (or color blind) hiring, we do so without any explicit
redistribution goal imposed on the part of the government.6 Second, the prejudice and bias
in our model are exogenous, which we assume to originate from society and may perpetuate
through employers’ own experience and sharing other employers’ experience. We do not try to
formalize this process, as it would require a dynamic framework and fall outside the scope of the
6See, for instance, Fryer and Loury (2013) for an analysis of identity-blind affirmative action policies with
redistribution objectives.
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present paper. One may speculate that such an endeavor may take the route of the statistical
discrimination model of Coate and Loury (1993), or the ‘echo chamber’ formulation of Levy and
Razin (2017, 2019).
Prejudice and bias can be cultural (as in India’s caste system), preference related (Becker,
1957), asymmetric information driven (Arrow, 1973), or perception based (Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan, 2004; Banerjee et al., 2009). Ours can be seen as a combination of asymmetric infor-
mation and misperception. In Section 2, a plausible scenario is discussed where the behavioral
traits such as confirmation bias can perpetuate an initial misperception toward a group. In the
concluding section, we also present an informal sketch of how our model can incorporate in a
minimalist way the formation of beliefs. Clearly, exogenous prejudice and bias can be seen as a
limitation of our model, but empirical evidence is sufficient to justify basing our policy evaluation
on them.7
In short, we assume that employers can be of four categories – being prejudiced to the advan-
taged, biased to the advantaged, and neutral to one or both groups. We rule out prejudice against
the advantaged and bias toward the disadvantaged, on empirical and behavioral grounds.8
In our model, if abilities were costlessly observable there would be no unemployment, and
no jobs/vacancies would remain unfilled, rendering the employers’ beliefs irrelevant. But unob-
servability of ability implies a strictly positive probability of unemployment for those who do not
or cannot acquire education. After filling some of the high value vacancies with the available
educated (and thus, revealed to be of high ability) workers, the remaining high value vacancies
can only be filled by a random draw from the uneducated pool. Here, the employers’ beliefs are
going play to a crucial role. Those employers who are prejudiced against the disadvantaged do
not fill their high value vacancies if they are matched with an uneducated disadvantaged group
worker. Likewise, employers who are neutral to the advantaged group will also leave their high
value vacancies unfilled if matched with an uneducated advantaged worker. This latter practice
can be called positive discrimination. Employers who are neutral to both groups will hire only
from the disadvantaged group, because their conditional belief of an uneducated worker being
high type will be greater for the disadvantaged group due to their low wealth level.
Under the EU and British law neither type of discrimination – positive or negative – is allowed
at the hiring stage, although minorities and disadvantaged groups can be selectively encouraged to
apply. Our model shows why concerns for either type of discrimination may trigger public demands
for identity neutral hiring. In reality, by hiding the candidates’ ethniicity/gender information at
the short-listing of interview stage (which is mandatory in UK) firms comply with the identity
neutrality requirement. In the subsequent selection stage, although the employers learn the group
7In our defense, we embrace the not-so-uncommon perception that is discussed in the media, as noted in the
introductory headline. Several important contributions have already emphasized the presence of prejudice and
bias; see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), Banerjee et al. (2009), and some selected papers on social identity
and discrimination edited by Chen and Mengel (2016).
8In a dynamic setting, whether these beliefs can persist or not is an important question. Reasons for persistence
of wrong beliefs have been analyzed by various authors, e.g., Black (1995), Lang et al. (2005), and Fryer and
Jackson (2008).
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identity of the candidate, procedures are supposed to be followed to prevent discrimination. In
our theoretical model, this is compressed as a single shot blind hiring. The employer draws an
uneducated worker without knowing the latter’s group identity and must fill the vacancy. This
occurs if the former’s expected belief of the latter being of high type exceeds a critical level;
otherwise the employer does not draw any candidate and leaves his vacancy unfilled.
We show that, under plausible conditions, the identity blind policy reduces unemployment,
but fails to eliminate it altogether. Employers who are neutral to both groups and employers who
are both prejudiced and biased are most likely to respond positively to the policy. But those who
are prejudiced against the disadvantaged and neutral to the advantaged will not budge at all;
they will leave their vacancies unfilled. Thus, there are limitations of the identity blind policy.
Furthermore, if the government wants to promote employment of the disadvantaged ahead of the
advantaged out of social and economic inequality concerns, as seems to be the case in the public
sector hirings of several countries (e.g., India, Malaysia, South Africa, Canada), identity blind
policy will entail a loss of positive discrimination. In some circumstances, identity blind hiring
can also increase unemployment if the extent of prejudice is deep; highly prejudiced employers may
prefer to leave their vacancies unfilled and unemployment would spread among the advantaged
as well.
One may argue that our results are partially affected by the assumption that education is
purely a signaling device. So we extend our model to a scenario where education enhances
productivity in the low value jobs.9 Low ability workers then will have an incentive to acquire
education for their own benefit, rather than to imitate the high ability types. Therefore, all the
wealthy workers will acquire education, high or low, depending on their abilities. Employers, in
turn, will be able to tell that lack of education is entirely due to wealth constraint. This will
help avoid discrimination of the advantaged group workers (in the hands of the neutral belief
employers). But the discrimination of the disadvantaged workers in the hands of the prejudiced
employers would continue, although the overall rate of unemployment will be lower in this case.
Identity blind policy can also eliminate unemployment fully, unlike in the case of pure signalling.
An interesting possibility arises here if the outside opportunities of the two groups are different
and economic returns to low education is smaller than the reservation income. Low ability advan-
taged group workers may not get educated at all, while their disadvantaged group counterparts
would still acquire education, because otherwise they will face a greater threat of unemployment.
This asymmetric education profile may also survive under identity blind hiring as part of a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. Empirically, it may not be an unrealistic scenario to see that the curse of
discrimination may motivate some ethnic groups to invest more in human capital than groups
who are favored by the society at large.
Finally, some comments on the government’s policy choice are in order. Our aim here is to
compare the costs and benefits of two alternative hiring policies, primarily in terms of unemploy-
9The qualitative results do not change if we allow education to increase productivity in both jobs. We discuss
this point in the relevant section.
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ment and education outcomes. The distributional implications have been studied along the way
as well. However, we chose not to explicitly introduce a utilitarian social welfare function to de-
termine the policy choice. The additional complexity of welfare based analysis would be justified,
if we were to recommend an optimal policy from a host of policies including mandated preferential
hiring of the disadvantaged (as in the USA for the Federal government), and job reservations (as
in India for backward castes) etc. Nonetheless, implicit in our analysis is a notion of social welfare,
in which the government attaches equal weight to both groups’ welfare, which are directly depen-
dent on their expected incomes. In the relevant sections of the paper, we do comment on how the
government’s policy choice might be affected, if it weights two groups unequally. For example, we
argue that when the identity blind policy backfires and increases unemployment, a government
may still adopt an identity blind policy if it values equal treatment more than anything else; to
eliminate unemployment in this circumstance, the government should offer subsidies to the firms
while recommending the blind policy.
Literature review. Our paper is close in spirit to Hendel et al. (2005) who first introduced credit
constraints in a Spencian education signaling model. Using a static model and then extending
it to a dynamic setup, they show that an educational subsidy can hurt low income individuals,
for reasons of losing out on the implicit positive discrimination. We adapt their static model by
allowing for two (differentially) credit constrained groups and two different types of employers.
Our focus is on the employment policy rather than the education policy.10
Hopkins (2012) studies ability signaling in a matching and labor market tournament. Workers
signal their types to vertically differentiated firms, the latter types being observable. Under
separation, assortative matching occurs and an agent’s job market outcome depends on her relative
ability ranking within the population. As the labor market competition increases, the higher
(lower) ability types increase (decrease) investment if wages are sticky; however, with flexible
wages, investment and wages fall for all abilities. In contrast to our paper, social identities of the
workers do not differ in Hopkins (2012), nor are employers prejudiced/biased.
In the empirical literature, the most potent argument against an identity neutral policy is that
of not creating a ‘level playing field’. Even if we ignore that, there is a subtle argument of losing
out on the positive discrimination that is possible only under identity-based decision making.
We should also emphasize that the scope for voluntary (and rational) positive discrimination
arises only in an ability signaling model, but not in a statistical discrimination model like that of
Coate and Loury (1993). In Coate and Loury’s model, ex post, there is nothing to infer about a
worker’s productivity, if she had not invested in education. She could only be given a low wage
commensurate to her low productivity. But in our signaling model, she still can be offered a
higher wage after being assigned to a high value job.
10For university admissions in the USA, Fryer et al. (2008), and Ray and Sethi (2010) highlighted some negative
consequences of switching to color-blind policies from race-based affirmative action. Kojima (2012), on the other
hand, shows that affirmative action can hurt minority students, the converse being that a color-blind policy can
benefit them.
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Before we proceed to the formal analysis, we would like to emphasize how identity neutrality
can be viewed very differently depending on the context. Fryer and Loury (2013) examined
if identity blind policies can achieve the same goal of improving diversity in the allocation of
productive opportunities that affirmative action explicitly pursues. In our case, identity neutrality
is motivated not so much to hide away from sighted policy, but to redress the ills of prejudice and
bias that manifest in a sighted environment. So, while in Fryer and Loury, identity blindness is
definitely more constraining (relative to sighted policy) for their redistribution objective, for us
identity neutrality is expected to yield some positive benefits.
After introducing the model next, the analysis comparing the two hiring policies are contained
in sections 3 and 4. Section 5 concludes. A separate Supplementary file contains the analysis of
an ideal world free of all prejudice and bias.
2 Job matching model
Workers. Consider an economy with two identifiable ethnic groups, ‘advantaged’ and ‘disad-
vantaged’, denoted by i = A,D, with NA and ND working age members respectively, whom we
call candidates or workers interchangeably. For convenience, assume N = NA + ND to be an
even number. Each candidate is born with an innate ability aj, high or low, j ∈ {h, `}, which is
going to matter in the jobs they will be assigned to by an employer. The probability of being of
high ability (j = h) is p, independent of ethnic and wealth backgrounds. We assume p > 1/2 to
suggest that the economy is fairly productive. All candidates have an outside option, e.g., self
employment, that gives a basic income of y0. But they prefer to be hired by a firm and earn a
higher wage.
We assume a particular type of wealth inequality for simplification: people either have zero
wealth or a substantially large wealth, ω ∈ {0,W}.11 Suppose βi fraction of group i do not have
any wealth, with βD > βA. Furthermore, βDND+βANA > N/2, i.e., there are more poor people
than the rich.
Neither ability nor wealth is observable. Ability is signaled only through education, which, in
turn, requires wealth, in the absence of a well-functioning credit market or government subsidy
on tuition. There are two components to education cost – tuition fee, F, and effort cost, which is
lower for the high ability type. Specifically, education cost is given by:
c(e, j) =
{
F+ 1aj e if e > 0, j = `, h,
0 if e = 0,
where ah > a` > 0. A wealthy and ability j candidate’s payoff is uj = W − c(e, j) + w, where
w is the lifetime discounted wages he earns.12 A wealthless candidate’s utility is u = w. All
11If wealth continuously varies across individuals, multiple equilibria may arise (Hendel et al., 2005).
12We do not carry out a dynamic analysis of education and employment. Instead, returns to education are
compressed into a single period.
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candidates are risk neutral.
Firms. There are (NA + ND)/2 firms, each having a portfolio of two jobs (or tasks), τ,
τ = H, L – one requiring high ability and for the other, ability does not matter. There is no strict
complementarity or substitutability between the two jobs, as each job independently produces
output y(τ, j), where
y(H,h) > y(L, `) = y(L, h) > y(H, `).
Matching of the H-type job with a high ability worker is most rewarding. Equally, a mismatch
of a high value job with low ability yields the lowest output y(H, `) which may necessarily be
positive. When y(H, `) < 0 and no candidate of known ability h is found, a firm may leave such
jobs unfilled. We make such ‘no hiring’ option costly for H-type jobs by imposing a ‘shut-down’
or ‘leaving vacant’ cost of κ > 0. The costs can arise due to losing corresponding customer base
to rival firms. For L-type jobs, there is no cost of leaving them vacant.
That y(L, h) = y(L, `) > 0 is assumed to reinforce the intrinsically low productivity nature of
the L-type job. Ability does not make any difference.
The wage policy is education based. When a worker is able to perfectly signal her ability h via
education, she will be assigned to an H-type job and paid a wage of αy(H,h), where α < 1 reflects
rent extraction by the employer due to the ‘hold up’ rendered by the matching mechanism rather
than a fully competitive labor market. But for an uneducated worker, wage is the minimum wage
w0. For simplicity, we set w0 = y(L, `) ≥ y0, where y0 is the reservation wage of workers. We
assume α to be such that αy(H,h) > w0, so despite the hold-up, an employer cannot push the
wage of a high ability candidate to a low ability candidate’s wage.
 Job matching and hiring protocol. As is clear, the number of total jobs equals the total
number of workers (NA + ND). Further, the total number of high ability candidates is greater
than the total number of high value jobs. Yet, due to wealth inequality, the number of workers
who are able to signal their high ability through education is strictly less than the number of
high value jobs. So, for some high value jobs there will not be enough educated workers, resulting
in matching inaccuracy. The following bound on the pool of rich, high ability workers will be
assumed.
Assumption 1. E = p[(1− βA)NA + (1− βD)ND] < N/2 < pN.
If all the rich and high ability candidates signal their ability through education, then E is also
the equilibrium pool of educated workers. Randomly selected E number of firms are matched with
one educated worker from the above pool. Then,
v := N/2− E = N/2− p[(1− βA)NA + (1− βD)ND]
number of firms will have to fill their high value jobs with uneducated workers or leave these
positions vacant. They will fill them provided the expected profit is no less than −κ.
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We assume, however, that the ex post cost of a mis-match is significant:
y(H, `) −w0 = y(H, `) − y(L, `) < −κ. (1)
That is, mismatch for a high-type job drives the ex post loss above the cost of holding the job
unfilled. Of course, ex ante, assigning an uneducated worker to an H-type job can still be optimal.
This is where the employers’ beliefs and the employment policy – sighted or blind hiring – will be
important.
After the hiring decisions for H-type jobs are completed, L-type jobs are filled simply by
drawing from the remaining pool. As ability does not matter for L-type jobs, random assignment
or otherwise does not make a difference for such jobs.
 Employers’ beliefs: Prejudice and bias. Employers form their beliefs about a worker’s
productivity potentially through two signals. The first signal is received about the two groups
– advantaged and disadvantaged, and the second signal is about an individual worker. If the
individual worker is appropriately educated, the worker’s ability is judged to be high, regardless
of what group-specific prior the employer had.13 If the worker is uneducated, the employer relies
on group-specific belief about the worker’s productivity.
The employers’ group-specific beliefs are formed by an exogenously given perception, which
we call social stereotype, and independent group signals observed by them. Social stereotypes are
formed through complex social interactions. These interactions help formation of certain beliefs
about the likelihood of a worker being high or low productivity depending on group identity. We
assume the following stereotype.
Social stereotype. Unless evidenced otherwise (through education signals), a candidate
from the disadvantaged group is believed to be less likely to be of high type than one from the
advantaged group. This will be our starting point.14
Each employer also draws an independent signal about each group – ‘negative’ or ‘positive’.
This could be due to an employer’s own labor market survey and/or his own past experience. By
negative (positive) signal of a group we mean that the employer thinks the (actual) likelihood of a
high ability worker is lower (higher) than the ex ante probability. The signals and the stereotype,
together, determine the employers’ individual beliefs, including bias and prejudice.
13We will mainly focus on wealth-constrained revealing equilibria. Note that we denote this a revealing equilib-
rium, rather than semi-separating, as those high-ability workers choosing no education are forced to do so given
their wealth constraint and not as part of a mixed strategy.
14As already discussed in footnote 7, there is strong evidence of stereotypes. Alternatively, we could have assumed
unprejudiced, unbiased employers and allow them to become prejudiced or biased through individual experience and
social interactions. This formulation, as shown in the Supplementary file, yields the result that rational employers,
before they become prejudiced or biased, would then discriminate positively in high value jobs favoring uneducated
(or less educated) disadvantaged (say, Black) candidates over similarly educated advantaged (say, White) candidates.
Clearly, such a position appears to be an unreasonable starting premise from point of view of the empirical evidence
of how the job market works in the real world. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), Banerjee et al. (2009), and
Chen and Mengel (2016), among others lend support to our hypothesis that employers are often prejudiced and
biased.
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Since bias and prejudice are in reference to the neutral beliefs, let us denote the conditional
probability of an uneducated worker of group i being high ability as:
ρi = Prob(h|e = 0, i) =
βip
βip+ (1− p)
(< pi), i = A,D.
The conditional probability of an uneducated worker being low ability is 1− ρi.
If there were no social stereotype and no signals about each group, the employer’s hiring
decision would be guided by the above neutral beliefs. If there were signals but no stereotype,
employers can deviate from the neutral beliefs in either direction. Finally, if there was only social
stereotype but no signals, all employers will be prejudiced against the disadvantaged group and
biased in favor of the advantaged.
In the presence of both the stereotype and signals, an employer’s belief can move in any direc-
tion or remain neutral. The following rules specify how the signals interact with the stereotype.
1. If a negative signal is received about group D, the social stereotype about group D is
reinforced due to the familiar notion of ‘confirmation bias’.15 The employer then believes
that, in group D, the share of high ability workers is λp, where λ < 1, and the low ability
workers’ share is (1−λp). The workers’ ability distribution in group D is (λp, 1−λp). This
is the case of ‘prejudice’.
The conditional belief of such prejudiced employers that an uneducated disadvantaged group





2. If a positive signal is received about group D, it helps to overturn the stereotype. The
workers ability distribution in group D is then reset to the one followed by nature (p, 1−p).
The belief becomes neutral. The employers will use their neutral belief ρD.
3. If a negative signal is drawn about group A, the stereotype is overturned. The employer
revives the neutral beliefs as (p, 1− p), which is given by ρA.
4. If a positive signal is received about group A, the ‘confirmation bias’ of the stereotype kicks
in. The employer then believes that the likelihood of a high ability worker in group A is δp,
where δ > 1. The workers’ ability distribution in group A is believed to be (δp, 1− δp). We
call this case one of ‘bias’.
The conditional belief of a biased employer that an uneducated advantaged group worker is





15The experimental literature provides ample evidence on the existence of confirmation bias – see, for instance,
Jones and Sugden (2001). Further, Charness and Dave (2017) show that, even in the presence of financial interests,
confirmation bias exists.
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Since the employers draw two signals, one for each group, there are four types of employers in
society, distributed as follows.
1. Category 1: Suppose r1 proportion of employers are prejudiced against D and neutral
towards A.
2. Category 2: r2 proportion of employers are neutral towards both groups.
3. Category 3: r3 proportion of employers are neutral towards D and biased in favor of A.
4. Category 4: Finally, r4 (≡ 1 − r1 − r2 − r3) proportion of employers are prejudiced against
D and biased in favor of A.
With stereotype as the default system of beliefs, the composition (r1, r2, r3, r4) will depend
on the actual draw of signals of employers. Employers steadfastly stick to their revised beliefs
after observing their private signals and act on these beliefs. In fact, they can and do calculate
the proportions (r1, r2, r3, r4), just like the job candidates, from the primitives, the underlying
distribution of private signals. We take (r1, r2, r3, r4) as given and common knowledge in the rest
of the paper, which can be justified for a large economy. The heterogenous beliefs can arise through
“echo chambers” and characterize labor markets, as argued in Levy and Razin (2017).16 Note
that our assumption of a common and unspecified distribution of private signals is an abstraction
but it gives rise to a similar heterogeneity of beliefs as in the echo chamber story of Levy and
Razin (2017). We leave the distribution unspecified to allow our analysis to connect the extent
and composition of prejudice and bias to policies.
3 Prejudice and bias
 Benchmark case - neutral beliefs. Let us first consider the case where all employers
believe that the probability of a worker being high ability is p, regardless of their group identity.
We confine our discussion to a revealing equilibrium where only the (wealthy and) high ability
candidates perfectly signal their talent through education.17 All others remain uneducated.
Under the policy of sighted hiring, employers will apply their conditional probability, in ac-
cordance with the equilibrium, ρA or ρD to assign an uneducated worker to an H-type vacancy.
Assign a group i uneducated worker to a vacant H-type job, if
Eπ = ρiy(H,h) + (1− ρi)y(H, `) −w0 = ρiy(H,h) + (1− ρi)y(H, `) − y(L, `) ≥ −κ
or, ρi ≥
y(L, `) − κ− y(H, `)
y(H,h) − y(H, `)
≡ ρ̂. (2)
16See also Levy and Razin (2019). Because our starting employer beliefs involve both prejudices and biases, we
allow the stereotypes to either persist or get partly or fully corrected. Levy and Razin (2017), on the other hand,
generate polarised beliefs endogenously in a dynamic model.
17One can also call it a semi-separating equilibrium, because the wealth constrained individuals cannot be sepa-
rated from the low ability individuals.
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Since βD > βA implies ρD > ρA, employers will have a preference for disadvantaged group
candidates, because the wealth constraint is more severe for them and the likelihood of failing
to signal high ability through education is greater for them than the advantaged group. This
is a case of positive discrimination by employers in favor of the disadvantaged. A formal result
demonstrating this is developed in the Supplementary file.
 Sighted hiring under prejudice and bias. When some employers are prejudiced against
the disadvantaged group and some are biased in favor of the advantaged, a number of possibilities
arise as to filling the H-type vacancies. The most interesting case arises when the prejudiced
employers (i.e., when categories 1 and 4) prefer to hold the H vacancy unfilled than hire a group
D uneducated worker (under sighted hiring). This will happen if
qDy(H,h) + (1− qD)y(H, `) − y(L, `) < −κ.





p[βD(1− ρ̂) + ρ̂]
}
. (3)
That means, in these employers’ perception, the likelihood of a high ability worker in group D
(λp) has to be sufficiently small.
As for the group A workers, there are two likely scenarios: (i) ρA ≥ ρ̂ so that, in the neutral
belief environment, group A uneducated workers were employable for the H-type jobs. The neutral
belief employers (categories 1 and 2) will continue to hire them, and the biased ones (categories 3
and 4) will also do the same, but with more enthusiasm. (ii) ρA < ρ̂, so that in the neutral belief
environment the group A workers were not hired. Now their prospect of being hired may improve
if they are matched with a biased employer. This is an interesting case and we will focus on this.
Suppose ρA < ρ̂ so that employers who are neutral to group A will not assign uneducated
workers from that group to H jobs. But those who are biased in favor of A, will do so if:
qAy(H,h) + (1− qA)y(H, `) − y(L, `) ≥ −κ.





p[βA(1− ρ̂) + ρ̂]
}
. (4)
That is, in the biased employers’ perception the likelihood of a high ability worker in group A (δp)
has to be sufficiently higher than nature’s draw (p). It is noteworthy that category 1 employers,
who are neutral towards group A and prejudiced against group D, will assign neither groups’
uneducated workers to H jobs. From either groups of workers they see their expected profit to be
negative.
Vacancies in H slots. Note that, given the distribution of wealth and high value jobs in the
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economy, v = N/2− E such jobs remain vacant after all educated workers are hired. The number
of uneducated individuals from group i is: Ui = Ni − p(1− βi)Ni, i = A,D, with U ≡ UA +UD.
Hence, the probability that any employer is matched with an uneducated candidate from group i is
Ui/U. Given the distribution of category of employers, without further loss of generality, we have
employer of category j with rjv (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) number of H-type vacancies. The prejudice/bias
of each of these employers implies that category 1 employers hold all these positions, r1v, vacant
rather than employing an uneducated candidate from either background. Category 2 employers
will leave r2vUA/U high value slots vacant, while category 3 employers will hire uneducated
worker from either background to fill their vacant H-type positions. Finally, category 4 employers
will leave r4vUD/U such positions vacant. Hence, the total number of vacant high value jobs is
v(r1 + r2UA/U+ r4UD/U).
Proposition 1 (Prospects for the uneducated). Assume sighted hiring, and suppose ρA < ρ̂ < ρD.
Further, λ and δ satisfy conditions (3) and (4), respectively. Then the following results obtain in
trying to fill in the high value slots with uneducated workers:
(i) Employers who are neutral towards group A and prejudiced against group D (category 1 em-
ployers) will not hire at all; they will leave their vacancies unfilled.
(ii) Employers who are neutral to group D and biased to group A will hire from either group and
have their vacancies always filled.
(iii ) Employers who are prejudiced against group D (categories 1 and 4 employers) will not hire
from group D, and the employers who are biased in favor of group A (categories 3 and 4
employers) will hire from group A.





This is a full manifestation of prejudice and bias under sighted hiring, hurting the disad-
vantaged group. What is interesting is that prejudiced/biased but otherwise rational employers
disregard the more stringent wealth constraints faced by the disadvantaged when recruiting un-
educated workers for high value positions. The positive discrimination that should favor the
disadvantaged disappears from their hiring and gives rise to vacancies. Given this, a blind hir-
ing protocol is likely to mitigate the adverse impacts of prejudice and bias, which we will soon
examine.
Education Choice
Now we see that, compared to the benchmark case of all employers having neutral beliefs,
group D workers will face some probability of unemployment (in the hands of the prejudiced
employers), and group A workers will have an improved prospect of employment, because the
biased employers will assign them to their vacant H jobs. Overall, both groups will face some
12














































≥ Ewi, and αy(H,h) − F−
e
a`
≤ Ewi, i = A,D,
that the acquired education level of group D will be higher than the education level of group A if
r4 > r2. That is, if the proportion of the employers who are both prejudiced against the disadvan-
taged and biased in favor of the advantaged is greater than the proportion of the employers who
are neutral to both groups, the disadvantaged will have to spend more effort and acquire greater
education to avoid the curse of prejudice.
The education levels of the two groups are determined by the following two sets of equations.
For group D








and for group A












1 (i = A,D). The equilibrium education level must be between e
i
1
and ei2 for each group i. With appropriate out-of-equilibrium belief restrictions, we can set e
i
2
as the separating equilibrium education level for the high type. Furthermore, as already noted,




2 – a disadvantaged group high ability
worker will have to acquire greater education than her counterpart in the advantaged group. The
cost of signaling is higher for the disadvantaged group.
Proposition 2 (More to prove, less to gain). If r4 > r2, the uneducated from the advantaged
group receives a higher expected wage than the disadvantaged group, i.e., EwA > EwD. Also,
the disadvantaged group workers will have to acquire more education than their advantaged group
counterparts.
This proposition thus reinforces Proposition 1 demonstrating how prejudice and bias demands
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more from the disadvantaged, in terms of education, and yet gives them less in return.
 Identity blind hiring. How can identity blind hiring impact on the hiring practice? First,
note that there will be no impact on group 3, who are biased in favor of group A and neutral
towards group D. Their beliefs are qA and qD and both are greater than ρ̂. Therefore, their
expected profit is positive, regardless of the group they hire from. So anonymity does not affect
them.
Second, group 1 employers, who are neutral towards group A workers and prejudiced against
group D workers will not change their behavior either. Previously, they were not assigning any
workers to H-type jobs, because ρA < ρ̂ and also qD < ρ̂. Under identity blind hiring their
expected profit is
Eπ = nA[ρAy(H,h) + (1− ρA)y(H, `)︸ ︷︷ ︸] + nD[qDy(H,h) + (1− qD)y(H, `)︸ ︷︷ ︸] − y(L, `)
< −κ+ y(L, `) < −κ+ y(L, `)
Therefore, for this group, Eπ < −κ and this group will continue to leave their vacancies unfilled.
Third, identity blind policy may have a positive effect on category 2 employers who are neutral
towards both groups. We have seen in the benchmark case of no prejudice or bias that this group
was positively discriminating in favor of the disadvantaged group. But, now, they hire from both
groups if nAρA + nDρD ≥ ρ̂. In other words, positive discrimination will disappear.
Fourth, likewise for the category 4 employers, who are biased in favor of group A and prej-
udiced against group D, identity blind policy may have significant implications. They will stop
discriminating against group D workers if nAqA + nDqD ≥ ρ̂. This condition follows from the
requirement Eπ ≥ −κ.
This indicates that, as compared to the sighted environment, categories 2 and 4 employers
change their behavior and now hire uneducated workers to fill all their high value jobs. Hence,
identity blind policy reduces unemployment and the number of vacant positions by v(r2UA/U +
r4UD/U) relative to the sighted hiring protocol.
While the conditions for the positive impact of the identity blind hiring policy may be met,
one thing becomes clear. The behavior of group 1 employers will remain unaffected – they will
leave their vacancies unfilled. This is a limitation of the identity blind policy.
Proposition 3 (Positive effect: identity blind hiring). Suppose nAρA + nDρD ≥ ρ̂ and nAqA +









Then, identity blind hiring policy leads to more vacancies being filled in, but the probability of
unemployment is not driven to zero; nor can the policy prevent discrimination in all cases.
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1. Employers who are neutral towards group A and prejudiced against group D (i.e., category 1
employers) will continue to leave their H-type jobs (r1v) unfilled if they do not find educated
workers.
2. Employers neutral towards group D but biased in favor of group A (i.e., category 3 employ-
ers) continue to hire candidates from either group.
3. Employers belonging to categories 2 and 4 will now hire workers from either groups. Pre-
viously, in the sighted environment category 2 employers were not hiring from group A and
category 4 employers were not hiring from group D.
4. Total unemployment is r1v; hence, unemployment falls by
v
U (r2UA + r4UD) relative to the
sighted hiring protocol.
Under blind hiring, prejudiced and biased employers can no longer “punish” discriminatingly
the disadvantaged, wealthless and hence uneducated workers by refusing them high value jobs. As
one would expect, despite their skepticism some would now agree to risk the average ability of the
uneducated and fill in their high value positions (rather than incur the cost of leaving those vacant)
because on average the recruited uneducated are of sufficiently high expected abilities given their
optimistic beliefs about the advantaged uneducated candidates’ skills. Surprisingly, though, it is
those employers who are wrong only about the disadvantaged but not about the advantaged (i.e.,
not biased but prejudiced) who may refuse to fill in their high value slots. This is because these
employers believe the loss caused by the relatively high proportion of low ability candidates among
the disadvantaged (significantly low λ), together with a high percentage of them not having wealth
(i.e., βD significantly larger than βA), makes the pool of uneducated job applicants a high risk
proposition. This is so especially because the same employers do not entertain any overoptimism
about the advantaged group’s high abilities (relative to neutral beliefs), denying them the buffer
of a sufficient number of their uneducated applicants being high ability types. On balance, these
employers will leave their high value slots unfilled. If this group of employers is significant in size,
identity blind hiring may not be able to lift up the economy much from the clutches of inefficiency
of sighted hiring. In contrast, under sighted hiring, the same employers would have recruited
uneducated applicants from the advantaged group for their high value slots.
Here, we may add that although our main aim is to contrast the two hiring policies in terms
of efficiency, we should be able to comment on the distributional aspect as well. As the identity
blind policy fails to alter the ‘no hiring’ behavior of category 1 employers, even under the best cir-
cumstances, we can clearly see that both groups will face a positive probability of unemployment.
However, as group D will have more uneducated workers (because it is less wealthy on average)
the expected number of unemployed will be larger for group D. Although we did not assume any
explicit social welfare function, implicit in our analysis is that the government weights the welfare
of the two groups equally. If one allows a greater weight on the welfare of group D, one might
argue that identity blind policy does not go very far, and may suggest other policies like direct
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affirmative actions such as mandated hiring of the disadvantaged workers. Clearly, that will be
outside the scope of our paper.
Proposition 3 paints a positive role of identity blind policies. However, if nAρA + nDρD < ρ̂,
category 2 employers, who are neutral towards both groups, expect the chance of an unedu-
cated h-type candidate drawn from the entire uneducated pool to be relatively low. Thus, these
employers will now leave their high value slots vacant if matched with an uneducated worker,
and unemployment will increase by r2vUD/U relative to the sighted case. Similarly, category 4
employers will leave their high value slots vacant when matched with an uneducated worker if
nAqA+nDqD < ρ̂; this results in increased unemployment under identity blind hiring by r4vUA/U
as compared to sighted hiring. Hence, we have:
Proposition 4 (Negative effect: identity blind hiring). Identity blind hiring can increase unem-
ployment under certain conditions.
1. If nAρA + nDρD < ρ̂, category 2 employers leave their high value slots vacant if matched
with an uneducated worker and unemployment increases by r2vUD/U relative to the sighted
case.
2. If nAqA+nDqD < ρ̂, category 4 employers do not hire any uneducated worker for high value
positions, thereby increasing unemployment by r4vUA/U under identity blind hiring policy.
3. If both the above conditions are satisfied, total unemployment is (r1 + r2 + r4)v. Hence,
overall unemployment increases under identity blind hiring by vU (r2UD + r4UA) relative to
sighted hiring.
In a way, as Proposition 4 shows, identity blind policy backfires, but also restores some parity
in the treatment of the two groups, because group A workers will now be the victims, as much
as the group D workers. From a social welfare point of view, if the government values ‘equal
treatment in bad times’ more than the ‘equal treatment in good times’, then it would press on
with the identity blind policy even under the circumstances specified in Proposition 4. In this
case, to eliminate unemployment, the government must also offer some subsidy to induce all firms
to hire. On the other hand, a government, which is weary of overall unemployment or unwilling
to offer subsidy, should refrain from the identity blind policy in such circumstances.
Education choice
Suppose condition (5) holds so that category 2 and 4 employers will both respond positively
and fill their vacancies under identity blind hiring. Previously under sighted hiring, category 4
employers were not hiring uneducated disadvantaged group workers and category 2 employers were
not hiring uneducated advantaged workers. Only category 1 employers will leave their vacancies
unfilled as before. Thus, not only the probability of employment increases for each group, but
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both groups also face the same probability of employment as well as the same probability of






























Clearly, the equilibrium choice of education must be between the two bounds given by the two










2 }, as Ew̃ > max{EwA, EwD}. That means when the
identity blind policy is beneficial, workers from either group will have to acquire less and the same
education.
Proposition 5 (Education choice under beneficial blind hiring). Blind hiring will always lead to
equal education choice for either groups. Further, suppose condition (5) holds so that blind hiring
reduces discrimination and unemployment. Then, the chosen level education will be unambiguously
lower than the sighted hiring level. Hence, the signaling cost will be lower for the economy.
The above Proposition spells out the most beneficial case of blind hiring. Although blind
hiring does not eliminate discrimination and unemployment fully, it does reduce unemployment
and signaling cost. The reason it cannot fully eliminate discrimination is that the policy cannot
prevent employers from holding vacancies unfilled.









only category 3 employers fill all their vacancies through identity blind hiring. All other employers
leave their H-type vacancies unfilled if matched with an uneducated candidate. The latter’s





















Note that the expected wage is strictly lower than both EwD and EwA of the sighted hiring case
because category 2 and 3 employers are not hiring now. Therefore, by the analogous reasoning as
before, it can be shown that there will be an adverse implication for education. Both groups of
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workers will choose a significantly higher (and common) level of education than the sighted hiring









2 }. Hence, the signaling cost will
rise under blind hiring, when the latter raises unemployment.
Proposition 6 (Education choice under detrimental blind hiring). When condition (6) holds, not
only does blind hiring raise unemployment compared to the sighted hiring case, but it also raises
the level of education necessary for signaling high ability.
4 Productivity enhancing education
Now let us assume that education contributes to worker productivity. To retain partially the pure
signalling aspect of education, we make the simplifying assumption y(H,h), the productivity of
high ability workers in high value jobs, is unaffected by education. As before, assignment of a
low ability worker to an H-type job is costly, regardless of what education the worker might have
acquired, i.e., y(H, `) < 0. That is, assignment of high ability workers to H-type jobs remains
crucial.18
Education, we assume, is going to enhance the productivity of the workers in L-type jobs
depending on the level of education of the worker (but not his ability).19 That is, y(L, e) > y(L, `)
if e > 0. As we have assumed when e = 0, y(L, `) = y(L, h) = w0, we can set y(L, e) as
y(L, `, e) = y(L, `)φ(e) where φ(0) = 1, and φ(e) > 1 for e > 0
and y(L, h, e) = y(L, h)φ(e) = y(L, `)φ(e) where φ(0) = 1, and φ(e) > 1 for e > 0.
The assumption that education enhances productivity only in the L jobs is mainly for simpli-
fication. We could allow productivity in the H jobs to increase with education (for the h-types).
However, it is easy to see that the h-type (wealthy) workers will then acquire their income maxi-
mizing level of education, or the separating level of education, whichever is higher. The fact that
the h-type cannot ever escape the burden of separation (from `) will always force them to choose
a minimum level of education, although we will see below that separation will be less burdensome
now due to the ` group’s incentive to choose their own income maximizing education, rather than
imitate the h type. Therefore, qualitatively we do not lose anything by assuming that education
does not enhance productivity in the H-type jobs.
18A simple justification would be that for high-end jobs the role of intrinsic ability of the worker is of paramount
importance and years of education, as in Spence’s signalling model, makes little difference on the margin.
19For example, for operators in call centers in India who respond to complains and enquiries from overseas
customers in the USA or UK, better fluency in speaking and writing English equips them to dispense with the calls
faster, improving customer satisfaction.
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Of course, we need to also ensure that an h-type will not deviate to an `-type’s education level
and get hired for an L job. We ensure it by assuming that a worker’s productivity in an L-type
job will not exceed y(H,h). In other words, y(L, e) → ȳ as e → ∞ and ȳ < y(H,h). When an
educated `-ability worker is assigned to an L-type job, his wage is w` = y(L, `) + α[y(L, `){φ(e) −
1}] = y(L, `)[1+ α(φ(e) − 1)] = y(L, `)[1+ α̃(e)].
 Key implications. Let us first take note of the key implications of education contributing to
productivity. Consider an equilibrium where all wealthy candidates acquire education. The high
ability candidates acquire e2 and low ability candidates acquire e1, where e1 < e2. There are two
noteworthy implications. First, now that the (wealthy) candidates reveal their types, no e1-level
educated candidate will be hired to H-vacancies; instead they will be employed to L-vacancies
only. The H-vacancies will be filled in as before by e2-level educated workers first, and then by
drawing from the uneducated pool, based on the employer’s belief. Therefore, as a possibility if
there are more e1-level educated workers than L-type jobs, then some of them will have to remain
unemployed. However, we will not consider such a possibility, because then it is implausible to
think of an economy where more than half of its population is ‘rich’.20
Second, for a neutral employer the conditional probability of an uneducated worker being of
h ability is same as the unconditional probability p, because the pool of uneducated workers
does not contain wealthy individuals, and likewise no wealthy candidate is uneducated. Since the
conditional probability is group invariant (for the neutral employers), the hiring practice, whether
sighted or blind, does not matter; they yield the same outcome. We should recall that in Section
3, where education did not affect productivity, neutral employers positively discriminated under
sighted hiring in favor of the disadvantaged group. The positive discrimination disappears now.
For the same reason as above, a prejudiced employer’s conditional belief will be λp for group
D and δp for group A.
Third, an implication of the neutral employers’ conditional belief (of h type) being just p is
that if all firms were neutral there will be full employment and all vacancies will be filled. To
see this, denote the group e2-level educated workers as E2 and the group of e1-level educated
workers as E1. The size of E2 is p[(1 − βA)NA + (1 − βD)ND]. Similarly, the size of E1 will be
(1−p)[(1−βA)NA+(1−βD)ND]. Assuming that less than half of the population is wealthy (for
each group), we must have E1 + E2 < N/2. After E2 workers are assigned to H-type jobs and E1
workers to L-type jobs, the remaining uneducated, (N−E1−E2), workers will be distributed into
the vacant H-type jobs and the remaining L-type jobs. The expected profit from an H-type task
assignment will be strictly positive (since p > ρD > ρ̂), and therefore all H-type vacancies will be
filled. Thus, neutral belief induces full employment. This is starkly different from the previous
case of positive discrimination, where neutral employers did not hire group A uneducated workers.
20In this exceptional scenario, some low educated workers will be unemployed, but all uneducated workers may
be employed (if the extent of prejudice is insignificant). Also, some H-vacancies will remain unfilled, for not having
enough ‘uneducated’ workers.
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Lemma 1 (Efficiency of neutral beliefs). Suppose all employers hold neutral beliefs and education
enhances productivity. Then no employer will discriminate positively or otherwise. No vacancies
will remain unfilled and no worker will be unemployed. Therefore, the mode of hiring – sighted or
blind – does not make any difference.
This result is starkly different from the previous case when education did not enhance productivity.
Fourth, what if some employers have prejudice or bias? Given that their conditional beliefs
of an uneducated worker being h-type are λp or δp (depending on the group they come from),
only the prejudiced employers (i.e., category 1 and 4 firms) will leave their H-vacancies unfilled,
if they are matched with a group D worker and if λp < ρ̂. In other words, their discriminatory
behavior is less likely now than in the previous case, because λp > qD. The biased employer’s
hiring of group A workers will not be affected. So, we can say that the chance of discrimination
and thereby the risk of unemployment are both smaller when education enhances productivity –
a sign of efficiency improvement.
Assuming λp < ρ̂, we calculate the probability of unemployment for group D workers as
follows.21 The probability of being picked up for a vacant H-slot is N/2−E2N−E1−E2 and also being
matched with a category 1 or category 4 employer is (r1+ r4)
N/2−E2
N−E1−E2
. Thus, their expected wage
is
EwD = (r1 + r4)
N/2− E2
N− E1 − E2
y0 + (1− r1 − r4)y(L, `). (7)
Now we will go into the question of education choice.
Education Choice
We will first consider the neutral belief case. Let us define e2 as the education level of the high
ability. Since there is no discrimination against any group, workers’ group identity is irrelevant
in the incentive or participation constraints. So we write the incentive compatibility conditions











− F ≥ y(L, `) (9)
and for the low ability workers as
y(L, `)(1+ α̃(e1)) −
e1
a`
− F ≥ αy(H,h) − e2
a`
− F (10)
y(L, `)(1+ α̃(e1)) −
e1
a`
− F ≥ y(L, `). (11)
21All group A workers – uneducated or educated – will be employed.
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− F ≥ y0
y(L, `)(1+ α̃(e1)) −
e1
a`
− F ≥ y0.
Since y(L, `) ≥ y0, if the incentive constraints are satisfied the individual rationality constraints
will also be satisfied. For the low ability type, the optimal level of education is e∗1 that maximizes
y(L, `)(1 + α̃(e1)) −
e1
a`





we obtain e∗1, we can set e
∗
2 from the equation
e2
ah




y(H,h) > y(L, `)(1+ α̃(e∗1)), the incentive compatible level of e
∗











The incentive compatible education choices e∗1 and e
∗
2 are demonstrated in Fig. 1. The equi-
librium e∗2 will always be to the right of e
∗
1. The low type’s optimal e
∗
1 corresponds to the peak of
the y(L, `)(1+ α̃(e1)) −
e1
a`





h type will not choose e∗1. Likewise, ` type will also not deviate to e
∗
2 because that would give less
utility (or net income) than the highest utility achieved by choosing e∗1. This is clear from Fig. 1.
An important aspect of this equilibrium is that e∗2 will be smaller than what was chosen under
the pure signalling case of education (with neutral beliefs). The reason is that previously the sole
purpose of choosing education for the high type was to separate from the low type, who had a
strong incentive to imitate the high type due to high wage differential. But now the low type
has an optimal level of education, say e∗1, and its net income is strictly greater than the previous
income w0 (or y(L, `)). The incentive constraint of the previous case is given by the dashed line
and the previous education choice (of the high type) was e2 as noted in Fig. 1. Now the cost of
signalling has fallen for the high type, because the low type has its own incentive to choose e∗1
rather than imitate the high type.
Choosing e∗1 and e
∗
2 must also be individually rational for the low and high types respectively.
That means, by not acquiring education the workers can earn at least y0 from self-employment or
an outside sector. We show in Fig. 1 that the incentive compatibility condition for the low type
is satisfied, because its highest utility strictly exceeds y(L, `) (denoted as w0). Since w0 > y0, the
individual rationality conditions are easily satisfied.
Prejudice. While the above discussion of education is presented for the benchmark case
of all firms being neutral, it can be easily seen that in the presence of prejudice and bias the
education result will not change, although now for group D workers there is a positive probability
of unemployment and their reservation wage (i.e., alternative to acquiring education) falls from






















Figure 1: The case of productivity of enhancing education




− F ≥ EwD, (13)
y(L, `)(1+ α̃(e1)) −
e1
a`
− F ≥ EwD. (14)
For group A workers the incentive constraints will not change. Since e∗1 gives a much higher payoff
than y(L, `) to a low type, and e∗2 gives even a much higher payoff to a high type worker, the
incentive constraint for choosing a positive education is easily met (for either types). Therefore,
the equilibrium levels of education e∗1 and e
∗
2 of the neutral belief case will still be the outcome
despite prejudice and bias. We skip the graphical presentation of this case, but the point made is
that regardless of the new obstacles of prejudice and bias, faced by ‘not acquiring’ education does
not alter the incentives to be educated, when education is not merely a signal, but productivity
enhancing at least for some jobs.
Lemma 2. When education enhances productivity in the low tasks, the low ability wealthy can-
didates will acquire e∗1 and the high ability wealthy candidates will acquire e
∗
2 levels of education,




2 is strictly less than the education level the high type candidates
chose in the earlier case where education did not enhance productivity. Moreover, the education
levels of both the high and low ability candidates will not vary across groups, regardless of blind
or sighted hiring, and employers’ beliefs.
 Identity blind. As is clear from the discussion above, identity blind hiring will not affect the
education choices. But it may alter the hiring behavior of some employers, in particular the ones
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prejudiced against the disadvantaged group. In other words, category 2 and category 3 employers’
behavior will not change. Category 1 and category 4 employers who are prejudiced against group
D may now change their hiring.
Category 1 employers will fill up the H slots, rather than leave them vacant if:22







. Likewise, category 4 employers will also fill up the
vacancies if:
EπG4 = nD[λpy(H,h)+(1−λp)y(H, `)]+nA[δpy(H,h)+(1−δp)y(H, `)]−y(L, `)] ≥ −κ ⇔ λpnD+δpnA ≥ ρ̂.
From the two inequalities it is clear, if the above inequality is satisfied for category 1 employers,
then the inequality for category 4 employers is automatically satisfied (because δ > 1). Then the
identity blind policy is beneficial. Alternatively, if the above inequality is violated for category 4,
then the identity blind policy is ineffective for both category 4 and 1 employers.
Proposition 7. Suppose education enhances productivity and some firms are not neutral.
1. The probability of unemployment is strictly positive under sighted hiring for the disadvan-
taged group workers if λp < ρ̂. But the education choice remains unaffected.
2. Under identity-blind hiring, there will be no unemployment if (λnD + nA)p ≥ ρ̂.
3. Identity-blind hiring will not reduce the probability of unemployment, if (λnD + δnA)p < ρ̂.
The general message is that when education enhances productivity, the signaling aspect of
education becomes less important. At least some workers – low ability workers in our model –
will choose individually optimal education level. Therefore, the signaling cost of the high ability
type is reduced. This is generally true regardless of employers’ beliefs being neutral or non-neutral.
The problems of the labor market do not much affect education decisions.
As for employment, the disadvantaged group will be discriminated against by those employers
who are prejudiced against them – category 1 and 4 employers. Of these two groups, category 1
employers are neutral toward group A, but prejudiced against D. If their expected probability
of an uneducated worker being H type exceeds ρ̂, then they will fill their vacancies. Category 4
employers will also fill their vacancies, because their expected belief will even be higher, as they
are biased toward group A. The condition for full employment reduces to the share of the poor
people of group D in the total poor population exceeding a critical level. So, in short if the poor
people come mostly from group D, then the identity-blind policy is likely to be more effective.
22This follows since P(h|e = 0,D) = λD and P(h|e = 0,A) = p given the beliefs of category 1 employers. The
number of h and `-types in group D who are uneducated are, respectively, βDNDλp and βDND(1 − λp). Hence,
these employers will hire an uneducated worker under identity-blind hiring protocol if βDND
βANA+βDND
[λpy(H,h) +
(1 − λp)y(H, `)] + βANA
βANA+βDND
[py(H,h) + (1 − p)y(H, `)] − y(L, `) ≥ −κ.
23
 Incentive constraints and asymmetric education
Sighted hiring. A key requirement for the low ability worker to acquire education is
y(e∗1) ≥ y(L, `). If not, the low ability worker will not find education and enhancing produc-
tivity worthwhile. We will go back to the case where only the high type gets educated. Now we
consider an interesting possibility, where EwD < y(e
∗
1) < y(L, `). This possibility can arise if the
cost of education (F) is substantial and the productivity-induced wage gain is marginal.
In this case, the equilibrium stated in Proposition 7 will not work. The disadvantaged group
low ability workers will acquire education, but the advantaged group low ability workers will not.
So when an advantaged group uneducated worker is matched with a category 1 or category 2
employer (both are neutral to group A) for a high value slot, he will be judged unemployable,
because their conditional belief about group A workers will be given by ρA, and by assumption
ρA < ρ̂. So, for group A uneducated workers now there is a positive probability of unemploy-
ment due to positive discrimination. For group D uneducated workers the positive probability of
unemployment is due to prejudice-induced discrimination, as before, which they can escape by
acquiring education high or low depending on their ability.
So what would be the equilibrium education profile and the assignment outcome in this case?
To simplify our presentation, we make an additional assumption that the advantaged group’s reser-
vation income is y(L, `) (or equivalently the minimum wage w0). That is, if they are unemployed
they can always get y(L, `) from their self-employment option, whereas for the disadvantaged
group’s reservation income is y0(< y(L, `)) as before. With this assumption in place, we propose
that the following education profile will be part of an equilibrium: From group A the h type
acquires eA2 and ` type acquires zero education. From group D the h type acquires e
∗
2, as given
by eq. (12), and the ` type acquires e∗1 as defined earlier.
The above equilibrium education profile is given by the following incentive compatibility con-




− F = y(L, `), (15)















− F > EwD,
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and for the ` type are
y(L, `)(1+ α̃(e∗1)) −
e∗1
a`
− F ≥ αy(H,h) − e2
a`
− F,
y(L, `)(1+ α̃(e∗1)) −
e1
a`
− F ≥ EwD.
Thus, we have an interesting education disparity between the two groups. In the advantaged
group, low ability individuals do not acquire education, because they are favored by the bias of
some employers and their outside option is also attractive. On the other hand, the disadvantaged
group, which faces discrimination and low outside opportunity, will acquire education to escape
discrimination. Furthermore, within each group the education disparity will also be different.
Within group A, eA2 will have to be significantly as ` types will try to imitate the h type. Within
group D, the difference between e∗1 and w
∗
2 would be far less. We have already noted in Lemma 2,
that eA2 will be strictly greater than e
∗
2. Thus, we will have the combined education profile of the





Proposition 8 (Possibilities under sighted hiring). Assume education enhances productivity and
some employers have non-neutral beliefs; further, EwD < y(e
∗
1) < y(L, `). Then in equilibrium, the
low ability wealthy individuals of the advantaged group will not acquire education and face ‘positive’
discrimination in the hands of category 1 and 2 employers (who are neutral to group A) along with
poor group A workers. On the other hand, the low ability wealthy individuals of the disadvantaged
group will acquire education, and only the poor members of this group will face discrimination
in the hands of the prejudiced employers (i.e., category 1 and category 4 employers). There is a
positive probability of unemployment for either group.
Identity blind hiring. Can the identity blind policy eliminate the above unemployment?
The answer is yes, if we meet the right condition. But the problem is, as soon as the identity
blind policy ensures full employment, the above mentioned education disparity of Proposition 8
will disappear. For the education disparity to survive, we must have unfilled vacancies by some
employers strongly influenced by prejudice against the disadvantaged group. Note that the em-
ployers cannot see the identity of the candidates. But category 1 and category 4 employers hold
prejudice against group D. In equilibrium, of course their updated belief of an uneducated group
D to be of high type is λp. Toward group A uneducated workers, category 1 and category 4
employers’ beliefs are ρA and qA respectively. So for these employers to leave their vacancies
unfilled, we must have
λpnD + ρAnA < ρ̂ (for Category 1) (16)
λpnD + qAnA < ρ̂ (for Category 4). (17)
On the other hand, for the identity blind policy to work for category 2 and category 3 em-
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ployers, who will fill their vacancies, we must have the following inequalities to hold for them:
pnD + ρAnA ≥ ρ̂ (for Category 2) (18)
pnD + qAnA ≥ ρ̂ (for Category 3). (19)
It is clear that if condition (17) holds, then condition (16) will also hold, because qA > ρA.
Similarly, if condition (18) holds, then condition (19) also holds. Therefore, our asymmetric
education acquisition for the low ability workers to survive under identity blind policy we must
have:
pnD + ρAnA ≥ ρ̂ > λpnD + qAnA. (20)




≡ 1− βAnA(δ− 1)
(βAδp+ 1− δp)(βAp+ 1− p)
. (21)
The second term on the right-hand side expression of the above is positive, since δ > 1. But it
is not a priori clear that it will always be a fraction. However, one can suitably choose nD large
enough (or equivalently nA) small enough to find a range of λ. Clearly, the extent of prejudice has
to be deep enough for the prejudiced employers to hold their vacancies unfilled for this equilibrium
to work. While the workers of both groups face unemployment, the consequence of unemployment
is asymmetric. The disadvantaged group faces a much lower expected income for not acquiring
education, and this prompts them to acquire some education and secure assignment in low jobs,
where their education enhances productivity and income. For the advantaged group the income
from low education is not high enough to exceed what they are assured of from self-employment
or blind (and probabilistic) assignment in high value jobs. Hence, they do not care to acquire
education.
As for the high ability types of either group, they will acquire a high level of education. But will
that be identical? It is not obvious. Suppose the policy is ‘blind hiring of all employees including
the educated workers’. That means, the employer can see education, but cannot ascertain the
group identity of the candidate (although by our assumption no prejudice or bias will apply in that
case). We can go through the incentive constraints of each group. For group A, the low ability
workers will choose e1 = 0 and face an assured income of y(L, `). By deviating from e2 > 0 to
e1 = 0 the high type will face just y(L, `). This will require the high type of group A to choose e
A
2 as
given by equation (15). On the other hand, for the disadvantaged group the incentive compatible
education profile is (e∗1, e
∗




2 . But if the educated
workers pool is also blind, then there will be a problem of attributing beliefs to three different




2 ). Therefore, we can impose an additional restriction on
the employers’ out-of-equilibrium belief that if e ∈ [e∗1, eA2 ) the employers will believe that they
are facing a low ability worker. This will prompt the high ability workers from the disadvantaged
group to acquire eA2 , the same level of education as the advantaged group workers.
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Proposition 9 (Muted influence of blind hiring). Suppose condition (20) holds. Then the asym-
metric education profile for the low ability wealthy individuals between the two groups will persist
even under identity blind hiring. The advantaged group low ability type will not acquire education,
and the disadvantage group low ability type will acquire education e∗1. The high ability individuals
of either group will acquire eA2 level of education.
The above proposition highlights a ‘negative’ result. Prejudiced-induced unemployment and
education disparity may not go away even with identity blind hiring, even if education enhances
productivity. But if the blind hiring does eliminate unemployment, then of course education
acquisition will be symmetric. One can set the appropriate conditions for that efficient outcome.
However, the sole purpose of this section was to demonstrate the possibility of an asymmetric
education outcome.
5 Conclusion
We presented a model of job matching in the presence of employer prejudice and bias, and have
shown that there will always be some unemployment as a section of employers would leave their
vacancies unfilled. Identity blind hiring can mitigate this problem under plausible conditions, but
there are situations when identity blind hiring can also make things worse. Policy makers need
to be mindful of these situations.
There are some limitations to our work. First, in countries such as India, Malaysia, South
Africa, and Canada there are explicit reservations in government jobs mandating hiring a certain
percentage of positions from disadvantaged group members. Our model is not appropriate for
such situations. Second, we studied prejudice only at the stage of hiring. Prejudice and unequal
treatments are of significant concerns for promotion and career progression as well, as is reflected
in the complaints of ‘glass ceiling’. Prejudice may affect firms’ decisions on employee-specific
investments, which can place an advantaged group employee in a favorable position in the race
for promotion. Third, as discussed earlier we have taken the belief distribution of the employers
as exogenous. One may argue that over time an employer who is biased toward the advantaged
group will earn less profits on average than a neutral employer. This will create an inconsistency
of the employer’s belief with his own profit experience. Clearly, the issue needs to be resolved by
making the beliefs endogenous. Below we briefly discuss one possible extension that would allow
the beliefs to be formed endogenously over time.
Suppose firms are long lived and the workers live for one period. Education is a pure signal.
Every period, N workers are born and their wealth and abilities are i.i.d., i.e., independently
and identically distributed. The group size also remains stable over time, as does the wealth
distribution. The same number of educated workers receive the high value jobs, and the remaining
vacancies are filled up by drawing from the uneducated workers’ pool. After the draw, the firm
decides whether to hire the worker or leave the post unfilled.
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Suppose initially all employers have the neutral belief. In the very first period, after all
educated workers are hired, from the uneducated pool only group D workers will be hired to fill
the remaining vacancies (positive discrimination) and all group A uneducated workers will be left
unemployed. At the end of the first period, all firms including the ones who have hired only the
educated workers post their experiences in a common repository. Feedback in the form of such
posting will be clearly positive about group A, because only the proven high ability individuals
of group A have been hired. But the feedback about group D will be mixed, ironically for the
very act of the positive discrimination. Thus, from the repository, an aggregate information is
generated for each group. Clearly, group A starts with only positive report and group D with
mixed reports.
From the second period onward, employers consider their own experience and the aggregate
information to form their beliefs about each group. Here, employers may vary in terms of how they
assign relative weights to their own experience and the aggregate information. The employers who
attach greater weight to their own experiences, are likely to have their beliefs eventually converge
to the true probability, i.e. neutral belief, assuming they try from the pool of uneducated workers
from both groups.23 It is also important to stress that people who largely rely on their own
experience will also earn higher profits on average, which in turn will reinforce reliance on their
own belief. Thus, in the absence of any preference for discrimination (in the sense of Becker) such
employers will uphold the neutral beliefs in the long run equilibrium of our model.
Other employers who value the aggregate information more than their own can form non-
neutral beliefs and even sustain them for many periods. The reason is that the aggregate infor-
mation may suffer from the initial bias we mentioned, i.e., the mixed report about group D and
positive report about group A. In the extreme case, where a large number of employers engage
in herding, early mistakes may be sustained for long time, if not perpetuated.
Of course, we need to be mindful that the firms whose beliefs are non-neutral will suffer in
terms of profits, either by forgoing good opportunities (not hiring from group D uneducated pool)
or by over-expecting from group A. Their negative experiences should eventually be reflected in
the aggregate information and one can hope that such non-neutral beliefs will eventually disappear
in the very long run. Until that happens, our analysis can be seen as a snapshot of the hiring in
play.
By now a large literature has emerged on social learning. The rational inattention literature
(see for instance, Caplin and Dean, 2015) shows that the process of learning is very complex as
agents tend to rely on both own and aggregate or social information, depending on the relative
costs of learning from alternative sources. There are additional cognitive issues as well as the
coarseness or reliability of social information. Even the aggregation of information is a complex
problem. While we wish to see the non-neutral beliefs wither away in the long run (and they
probably do, as can be seen from the progresses made on gender and race issues over the last few
23Along with belief adjustment such employers are also likely to modify the distribution of weights with increasing
reliance on individual experience.
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decades), their persistence can be more than temporary.
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